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TORTS-1955 TENNESSEE SURVEY
JOHN W. WADE*
I. NEGLIGENiCE

1. Breach of Duty to Use Care
The decision of whether a defendant is negligent is normally for
the jury to decide. This year, as in other years, the Tennessee courts
have taken frequent opportunity to emphasize this,' though a directed
verdict is proper when the jury could reasonably reach only a single re2

sult.

The negligence issue is submitted to the jury in terms of the usual
standard-whether the defendant acted as a reasonable prudent person
would have acted under the same or similar circumstances. 3 At
times some of the circumstances may be more specifically adverted to
in the instructions. Thus, under the "emergency", or "sudden peril
doctrine," specific reference is made to the emergency and the jury
may be told that "he is not held to the same accuracy of judgment as
would be required of him if he had time for deliberation." 4 The only
cases raising this matter during the Survey period did so for the
purpose of emphasizing the limitation on the "doctrine" to the
effect that it is inapplicable when the defendant creates the emergency
by his own negligence.5
* Dean, Vanderbilt University School of Law; member, Tennessee Bar.

1. E.g., Noe v. Talley, 274 S.W.2d 367 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1954) (automobile
collision); East Tennessee Natural Gas Co. v. Peltz, 270 S.W.2d 591 (Tenn. App.
E.S. 1954) (use of explosives); Chattanooga Gas Co. v. Underwood, 270 S.W.2d
652 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1954) (gas explosion); Massey v. Chattanooga Station
Co., 210 F.2d 167 (6th Cir. 1954)(safe place to work for employee). See the
extensive discussion by Judge Hickerson in Finks v. Gillum, 273 S.W.2d 722
(Tenn. App. M.S. 1954) (automobile accident).

2. "Only where one conclusion can be reasonably reached from the evidence

and inferences is it proper for a trial court to direct a verdict." Howard, J., in

Shuler v. Clabough, 274 S.W.2d 17, 20 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1954) (automobile

accident-directed verdict improper). In Rader v. Nashville Gas Co., 37 Tenn.
App. 621, 268 S.W.2d 114 (M.S. 1954) (gas explosion), a directed verdict was
held proper. In Horne v. Palmer, 274 S.W.2d 372 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1954), jury
verdicts were so confused and inconsistent that the court held they should
be set aside and a new trial granted.
3. See, e.g., Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Wade, 127 Tenn. 154, 158, 153 S.W.
1120, 1121, Ann. Cas. 1914B 1020 (1912).
4. McClard v. Reid, 190 Tenn. 337,345, 229 S.W.2d 505,508 (1950). Some of
the earlier cases seemed to express the standard here on a more subjective
basis. Thus in Moody v. Gulf Ref. Co., 142 Tenn. 280,293, 218 S.W. 817, 820,
8 A.L.R. 1243 (1920), the court quoted a statement that "One who in a sudden
emergency acts according to his best judgment, or who, because of want of
time in which to form a judgment, omits to act in the most judicious manner
is not chargeable with negligence." But in the McClard case, supra, the court

correctly phrased the test according to objective standards: "Accordingly if
he exercised such care as an ordinarily prudent person would exercise when
confronted by a like emergency, he is not liable for an injury which has
resulted from his conduct, even though another course of conduct would have
"
been more judicious or safer or might even have avoided the injury ....
5. Tennessee Copper Co. v. Smith, 216 F.2d 428 (6th Cir. 1954); Hopper v.
1131
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In certain types of activities the defendant may be held to a higher
standard of care than that of the ordinary prudent person. Thus, in
East Tennessee NaturalGas Co. v. Peltz,6 where defendants were blasting, they were held to be "under a duty to exercise the highest degree
of care possible." In several cases the court made a point of declaring that the defendant was not an insurer but was under a duty
to use only reasonable care. 7
When a statute or ordinance lays down a definite rule of conduct,
this rule takes the place of the general standard given to the jury,
who are told that violation of this rule is negligence per se. There
were several references to the negligence per se doctrine during the
Survey period;8 but the only one worthy of special mention is Home
v. Palmer,9 holding that a statutory 30 m.p.h. speed limit for a "business or residential district" prevails over a Department of Safety sign
of 45 m.p.h. Occasionally, the courts themselves lay down a specific
rule of conduct instead of the general standard. An example of
decreasing importance is the assured-clear-distance-ahead rule, to the
effect that one must drive slow enough to be able to stop within the
range of his vision ahead. Recent cases have indicated that exceptions and qualifications to this rule have practically eroded the rule
away.10 This was recognized by Judge Darr in Hopper v. United
States," but he properly indicated that the qualifications on the
rule are as to its effect as a "matter of law" and that the fact-finder
may well find a person negligent who drives faster than the range
of his headlights warrants.
Proof of negligence, or of breach of duty, is normally by direct
evidence of what the defendant did. There are times, however, when
United States, 122 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. Tenn. 1953), af'd mem., 214 F.2d 129 (6th
Cir. 1954).
6. 270 S.W.2d 591, 605 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1954). Several earlier Tennessee
cases had held that there is strict liability for blasting operations, so that no
proof of negligence is necessary. See, e.g., Knoxville v. Peebles, 19 Tenn. App.
340, 87 S.W.2d 1022 (W.S. 1935); Aycock v. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry., 4 Tenn.
App. 655 (M.S. 1927). This rule is not referred to in the instant case, which
may be distinguishable on the possible ground that since plaintiff had contracted to allow defendant to conduct the blasting operations on his land, he
could complain only for negligent operation.
7. E.g., Glassman v. Martin, 269 S.W.2d 908 (Tenn. 1954) (landlord); Chattanooga Gas Co. v. Underwood, 270 S.W.2d 652 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1954) (gas
company).
8. E.g., Shuler v. Clabough, 274 S.W.2d 17 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1954) (failure to
put out flags for parked truck); Louisville & N. R.R. v. Farmer, 220 F.2d 90
(6th Cir. 1955)(municipal ordinance-speed limit); Hopper v. United States,
122 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. Tenn. 1953), aff'd mem., 214 F.2d 129 (6th Cir. 1954)
(statutory rule of the road).
9. 274 S.W.2d 372 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1954).
10. See discussion of last year's cases, Wade, Torts-1954 Tennessee Survey,
7 V.m. L. Rnv. 951, 952-53 (1954). And see 23 TENN. L. REv. 1073 (1955), discussing Shuler v. Clabough, 274 S.W.2d 17 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1954), treated later
herein.
11. 122 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. Tenn. 1953), aff'd mem., 214 F.2d 129 (6th Cir.
1954).
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the evidence must be circumstantial in nature, the nature of the accident and the circumstances surrounding it indicating that (1) someone must have been negligent and (2) that person must have been the
defendant. In the field of negligence this type of circumstantial
evidence goes by the grandiose name of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur. The leading Tennessee case on res ipsa loquitur is Sullivan
13
2 discussed last year. In McCloud v. City of La Follette,
v. Crabtree,'

Judge Hale quotes Judge Felts' opinion in the Sullivan case at considerable length. The facts in the McCloud decision were as follows:.
An employee of the defendant city was operating the city's truck-and
trailer, using it to water streets late one night. The vehicle rolled
down a hill into the plaintiff's building, damaging it. The employee
was found in the street, higher up the hill, and he died without being
able to tell what happened. There were no witnesses. The court of
appeals held that this was properly treated by the trial court as a
res ipsa case and that a jury verdict for the plaintiff was warranted.
On the question of the procedural effect of a res ipsa case when it
exists the court held that the trial court was correct in instructing the
jury that the event "merely warrants an inference of negligence which
the jury may or may not draw as its judgment under all the facts and
circumstances may dictate. It merely permits the jury to consider
and choose the inference of defendant's negligence, if any, in preference to other permissible and reasonable inferences."' 14 This follows
the majority rule and is consistent with the Sullivan opinion.15
The court held that the trial court was correct in declining to instruct that the doctrine will not apply unless the defendant has
superior knowledge of the cause. This is a proper holding in the
normal case of res ipsa loquitur since the strength of the inference to
is not debe drawn from the events (the circumstantial evidence)
16
pendent on which party has the greater knowledge.
Finally the court held that allegations of specific acts of negligence
in the declaration might be treated as mere surplusage and disregarded. This is one of some four views regarding the effect of allegations of specific acts of negligence on a res ipsa case. Some courts
disagree entirely and hold that specific allegations constitute an
abandonment of the res ipsa case; others take positions in between.
7
But this is the Tennessee rule, laid down by earlier decisions.'
Several other cases deserve mention in connection with the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur. In ChattanoogaGas Co. v. Underwood,18 involv12. 36 Tenn. App. 469, 258 S.W.2d 782 (M.S. 1953).
13. 276 S.W.2d 763 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1954).
14. Id. at 767.
15. See, in general, PROSSER, TORTS § 43 (2d ed. 1955).
16. Id. at 209-10.
17. Nashville Interurban Ry. v. Gregory, 137 Tenn.422, 193 S.W. 1053 (1917).
For discussion of the several rules, see PROSSER, TORTS 214-15 (2d ed. 1955).
18. 270 S.W.2d 652 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1954).
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ing a gas explosion in a bathroom, the court declared that "under the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the explosions having been proved and
the origin having been established as gas escaping from a main under
defendant's exclusive control, the burden shifted to the defendant
to show freedom from negligence."'19 In Railway Express Agency, Inc.
v. Smith20 the court held that when damage occurs to goods while
they are in the exclusive control of a carrier, "an inference of negligence may be drawn, thereby shifting to the carrier the burden of
going forward with the evidence when proof is adduced to the effect
that (1) the shipment was in good condition and properly packed
when received by the carrier, and (2) that it was damaged when the
carrier delivered it to the consignee." 21 The meaning of the term
"burden" in these two quotations is not perfectly clear. It appears
to mean that in either or both of these two situations the res ipsa
case creates an inference so strong that there will be a directed verdict
for the plaintiff unless the defendant meets the burden of introducing
evidence in rebuttal of the case and brings the case back into the
province of the jury. On the other hand, it is possible that it simply
means that there is a case sufficient to go to the jury and that the jury
is likely to hold for the plaintiff unless the defendant supplies rebutting evidence. 22
Butler v. Molinski, 3 was an action of malpractice in setting a
fractured wrist. The court held res ipsa loquitur not applicable and
indicated that a failure to cure does not give rise to an inference of
negligence. There was expert evidence that defendant's treatment
followed customary practice. On the other hand, in Dunn v. Ralston
Purina Co.,24 the court held that when horse feed, delivered in unopened and unaltered bags, was found to be spoiled a "prima facie
case of negligence" was established.
2. Causation
"In every case the question of proximate cause, or legal cause, or
cause in law, involves first an inquiry into the question of cause in
fact. If that inquiry shows that defendant's conduct, in point of fact,
was not a factor in causing plaintiff's damage, that ends the matter.
19. Id. at 658.

Cir. 1954).
21. Id. at 50.
22. The second meaning may well have been intended in the gas case. For
a collection of other cases on res ipsa loquitur and leakage from gas mains, see
20. 212 F.2d 47 (6th

Annot., 26 A.L.R.2d 136, 192 (1952).

In the carrier case, however, the court must have had in mind the first
meaning. See the discussion of Judge Anderson in Illinois Cent. R.R. v. H.
Rouw & Co., 25 Tenn. App. 475,159 S.W.2d 839 (W.S. 1940). Indeed, as that
opinion makes clear, the liability of a carrier of goods is essentially that of
an insurer, with certain exceptions, such as perishable goods, involved in the
Rouw case but not in the instant case.
23. 277 S.W.2d 448 (Tenn. 1955).
24. 272 S.W.2d 479 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1954).
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But if it shows his conduct was a factor in causing plaintiff's damage,
then the further question is whether his conduct played such a part
in causing the damage as makes him in the eye of law the author of
such damage and liable therefor." This quotation from Judge Felts'
opinion in this year's case of Carney v. Goodman2 5 affords an apt
introduction to the subject of causation in negligence.
The initial determination of cause in fact, being a factual issue, is
of course for the jury. Thus, in East Tennessee Natural Gas Co. v.
Peltz,26 defendants in laying a gas line, set off heavy charges of explosive; the question was whether these blasting operations caused
the destruction of plaintiff's concrete dam. There was sharply conflicting testimony and the court held that the jury verdict should stand,
declaring that, "Where there is a conflict between expert or scientific
testimony and testimony as to facts, the jury must determine the
relative weight of the evidence.12 7 The one exception to the rule
that factual cause is necessary to impose liability upon the defendant
arises from a long standing interpretation of the Railroad Precaution
Statute (Code Section 2628) .2 In two cases during the Survey period,
this unusual holding was regarded as controlling,29 but the court explained in one of them that it is limited to this single statute and does
not apply to other bases on which the railroad might be held liable. 30
As Judge Felts indicated in the Carney case, the most appropriate
way to express a test for cause in fact is to consider whether the defendant's negligence "was a substantial factor in 'causing plaintiff's
damage."3' In the Carney case, defendant Stamper had parked her
car diagonally on the side of a highway so that it protruded from two
to five feet into the paved part of the road, which was slick from
fresh oil and rain. The driver of a first truck came up to her car and
stopped, since the other lane was filled with heavy traffic. The driver
of a second truck failed to observe that the first one had stopped until
he came within 150 to 200 feet of it. He immediately put on his brakes
but because of the oil slick was unable to avoid hitting the first truck.
Plaintiff was in the back of the second truck with a large, heavy tar
kettle. This kettle slid forward, crushing plaintiff against the cab
of the truck. The trial judge gave a directed verdict against the
plaintiff on the ground that "the cause of the accident was the slick25. 270 S.W.2d 572,575 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1954).
26. 270 S.W.2d 591 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1954).
27. Id. at 603. See also Dunn v. Ralston Purina Co., 272 S.W.2d 479 (Tenn.

App. M.S. 1954), where there was a similar conflict of expert opinion on
whether spoiled feed caused the death of a horse by colic. Here, too, the
court held the issue was for the jury.
28. Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Davis, 104 Tenn. 442, 58 S.W. 296 (1900).
29. Louisville & N. R.R. v. Farmer, 220 F.2d 90 (6th Cir. 1955); Illinois
Cent. R.R. v. Perkins, 79 So.2d 459 (Miss. 1955) (Tennessee law).
30. Louisville & N. R.R. v. Farmer, supra note 29, at 99.
31. 270 S.W.2d at 575.
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ness of the road." The court of appeals reversed so far as defendant
Stamper was concerned and remanded for a trial.3 2
Clearly Stamper's negligence was a cause in fact of plaintiff's injuries. As the court phrased it, it was not only a "substantial factor,"
it was "the most important factor, for it really put the others into
operation." Legal cause is sometimes determined by the court but
is often left also to the jury. The court held that the issue should have
been submitted to the jury here. It said: "[H] er negligence, as a legal
or proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries [was not] superseded by the
intervening acts of the two truck drivers. Such acts were within the
range of the risk created by her negligence, were reasonably foreseeable as a likely result thereof, and were not new, independent,
or superseding causes; for her negligence was continuous and operative up to the instant of the collision, or so the jury might have
33

found."

In Rader v. Nashville Gas Co.,34 defendant gas company removed
a meter from a building but left the gas pipes in the ground. The
building was later torn down and the ground graded and filled. Heavy
machinery apparently broke the gas line and escaping gas gradually
accumulated in plaintiff's attic where it exploded. The court of appeals
affirmed a directed verdict for the defendant. It declared that it could
not find "any evidence which indicates that this explosion was caused
by any negligence of this defendant." 35 This settled the problem, since
if the defendant *as not negligent there was no need to consider or
discuss the problem of causation. But, following the lead of the trial
court, the court cited and quoted from the line of Tennessee cases that
"an injury which could not have been foreseen nor reasonably anticipated as the probable result of an act of negligence is not actionable."3- The holding of no negligence was therefore buttressed by an
additional indication of no proximate cause.37
32. Suit was against Stamper and against both the driver and owner of the
first truck and a verdict was directed for all defendants. The court of appeals
affirmed the action as to the truck driver and owner on the ground that there
was no evidence that the truck driver was negligent in any way.
33. Id. at 575. It adds that if the second driver had seen the standing vehicle
in time to enable him to avoid the collision but with this knowledge had still
negligently failed to stop in time to avoid the collision, his negligence would
have cut off Stamper's liability.
34. 37 Tenn. App. 621, 268 S.W.2d 114 (M.S. 1954).
35. Id. at 116. See also: '"We cannot say that this defendant was guilty of
any negligence in not foreseeing that this lot upon which a restaurant building
had stood would be graded and filled and run over by heavy machinery and
equipment and the gas pipes under the ground broken, allowing gas to escape
and flow under ground to the building of the plaintiffs next door to the lot,
over ninety days after the meter was removed." Id. at 117.
36. The quotation comes by way of Wallace v. Electric Power Board, 36
Tenn. App. 527,531, 259 S.W.2d 558,560 (E.S. 1953), from Moody v. Gulf Ref.
Co., 142 Tenn. 280,290, 218 S.W. 817,819, 8 A.L.R. 1243 (1920).
37. This holding seems somewhat questionable. If the defendant had by
some chance been found negligent in leaving the gas pipes in the ground with
gas in them, this must have been because it created the risk that someone not
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In the Survey issues for the two previous years I have called
attention to the fact that the Tennessee courts have developed several
independent lines of authority regarding the test for proximate cause,
from the very narrow test quoted in the Rader case to the very broad
one requiring merely factual cause,38 with several positions in between.39 This provides a desirable flexibility and freedom of decision
for the appellate courts, but it produces a misleading appearance of
certainty and directs attention away from the exercise of discretion
which is the essence of the decision. There is much to be said for
phrasing the test in terms of a standard (like the standard of the
reasonable, prudent man for determining negligence) which affords
the same flexibility and yet points up the element of discretion which
must be exercized by the determining agency, whether it is jury, trial
judge or appellate court. Such a standard is adequately expressed
by saying that there must be a reasonably close connection between
the risk created by the defendant's negligent conduct and the damage
or injury suffered by the plaintiff.40 This provides only a slight change
from the language of the court in the Carney case, quoted above, 41
and that used in several earlier decisions.42 The addition of the phrase
"reasonably close connection" turns the test into a standard and
emphasizes the discretionary aspect of the decision.
3. Defenses
Since the decision of Creekmore v. Woodard43 in 1951, it has been
assumed that when the defendant is irequired to plead specially, he
must plead contributory negligence in order to rely on it as a defense. 44 The case of Gerwin v. American News Co.,45 raises a slight
question in this connection. Plaintiff sued for damages sustained
knowing what the pipes were or not knowing that they were there might
negligently interfere with them or damage them in some way and cause gas
to escape. This is exactly what happened. It would, therefore, seem to have
been better for several reasons to have decided the case simply on the basis
of no negligence.
38. See, e.g., Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. Zopfi, 93 Tenn. 369, 24 S.W. 633
(1894); Deming & Co. v. Merchants' Cotton-Press Co., 90 Tenn. 306, 17 S.W.
89, 13 L.R.A. 518 (1891). These are the cases usually cited when a jury verdict
for plaintiff is sustained, just as the Moody case is usually cited when the case
is taken out of the hands of the jury and a decision rendered for defendant.
39. See Wade, Torts-1953 Tennessee Survey, 6 VAND. L. REv. 990,1000-02
(1953); Wade, Torts-1954 Tennessee Survey, 7 VAn. L. REv: 951,958 (1954).
Tennessee cases are also discussed in Comment, Proximate Cause: A Checkered
Landscape in Tennessee, 23 TNNz-.L. REv. 1015 (1955).
40. For elaboration, see Wade, Book Review, 8 VAMN. L. REv. 657, 660-63
(1955).
41. See text to note 33, supra.
42. E.g., Inter-City Trucking Co. v. Daniels, 181 Tenn. 126, 131, 178 S.W.2d
756,758 (1944); Spivey v. St. Thomas Hospital, 31 Tenn. App. 12,25, 211 S.W.2d
450,455 (M.S. 1947).
43. 192 Tenn. 280, 241 S.W.2d 397 (1951).
44. See Lively v. Atchley, 36 Tenn. App. 399, 256 S.W.2d 58 (E.S. 1952),
(facts only and not technical legal conclusions are required).
45. 270 S.W.2d 354 (Tenn. 1954).
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when water flooded a basement which it was renting, claiming that
defendant, another tenant in the building, negligently allowed water
to escape from his part of the building. Defendant's plea in response
to an order under Code Section 8767 to plead specially was that the
basement was not flooded with water coming from the premises occupied by him. Under this plea he was allowed to introduce evidence
that the water came from a broken water pipe maintained by the city
in the street for the reason that this showed the water did not come
from his premises. Could a defendant plead that plaintiff's injury
was not caused by defendant's negligence and then introduce proof of
plaintiff's contributory negligence under the contention that it was
the cause of the injury? Probably not. Plaintiff's contributory negligence does not necessarily mean that defendant was not negligent
or that his negligence failed to contribute to the injury.
The harshness of the common-law rule that contributory negligence
on the part of a plaintiff completely bars his recovery has produced
numerous exceptions and qualifications on the rule. Most states agree
that when defendant is guilty of an intentional wrong or of wilful and
wanton misconduct, contributory negligence does not bar his recovery.
In Tennessee the same position is taken when the defendant is guilty
of gross negligence. This was reiterated during the year in the case
of Shuler v. Clabough.46 But an allegation of gross negligence and
wilful and wanton misconduct in the declaration is not enough to
warrant an instruction to the jury; the allegation must be supported
47

by proof.

There were no cases during the Survey period involving the doctrine
of last clear chance. Several cases, however, involved the Tennessee
doctrine of remote contributory negligence, under which plaintiff's
negligence, if classified as remote, does not bar recovery but serves
48
instead to mitigate damages. In Louisville & N. R.R. v. Farmer, involving a crossing collision, the court referred to the doctrine and
declared that the issue was for the jury whether the decedents were
"guilty of either proximate or remote contributory negligence." In
Horne v. Palmer,49 the court declared that from the evidence there
was a permissible inference that one of the two plaintiffs "was guilty
of proximate or remote negligence. The finding of some amount, small
though it is, in his favor negatives a finding of proximate negligence,
leaving remote negligence as the only possible jury finding against
46. 274 S.W.2d 17 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1954), 23 TENN. L. REv. 1073 (1955). The
court relies on Inter-City Trucking Co. v. Daniels, 181 Tenn. 126, 178 S.W.2d
756 (1944); and Mason v. Burgess, 8 Tenn. Civ. App. 138 (1917). See also
Stagner v. Craig, 159 Tenn. 511, 19 S.W.2d 234 (1929), where gross negligence
and wilful and wanton misconduct are apparently regarded as equivalent
terms.
47. Roach v. Franzle, 37 Tenn. App. 629, 268 S.W.2d 118 (M.S. 1953).
48. 220 F.2d 90 (6th Cir. 1955).

49. 274 S.W.2d 372 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1954).
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the Hornes."5 0 But the verdicts and the evidence indicated such confusion on the part of the jury that a new trial was granted.
Three cases also involved application of the Railroad Precaution
Statute (Code Section 2628) and the established interpretation of it
that contributory negligence, whether proximate or remote, will have
the effect only of mitigating damages. 5 ' In one of them the jury were
peremptorily instructed that the deceased was guilty of contributory
negligence, and the court declared that it was "manifest from the
size of the verdict that the jury applied the contributory negligence
of the deceased in the reduction of damages."2
This approach to the problem of contributory negligence-treating
it not as a complete bar to recovery but letting it go in diminution of
damages-has had for many years an established basis for certain
types of cases in Tennessee, and there are strong arguments that it
should become the general rule, applicable to all types of negligence
suits.5 3
The matter of imputed negligence was raised in Hamilton v. Peoples.5 4 The court of appeals held that the lower court was wrong in
instructing that a driver's negligence is imputed to his passenger. As
the court indicated, however, the passenger may himself be negligent.5 5 The court found that under the facts of the Hamilton case, the
parties in the car, having gone to Florida on a fishing trip under an
expense-sharing arrangement, were engaged in a joint enterprise.
This meant that the negligence of one would be imputed to the others
in an action against a third party. But this was an action between
the parties themselves, and after indicating the confusion in the Tennessee cases the court announced what is clearly the better rule, that
imputed negligence is not applied in an action between the joint
entrepreneurs themselves.5 6
50. Id. at 374.
51. Louisville & N. R.R. v. Farmer, 220 F.2d 90 (6th Cir. 1955); Louisville

& N. R.R. v. Tucker, 211 F.2d 325, modified on rehearing, 215 F.2d 227 (6th

Cir. 1954); Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Perkins, 79 So.2d 459 (Miss. 1955) (accident in
Tennessee and Tennessee law applied).

52. Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Perkins, 79 So.2d 459,468 (Miss. 1955).
53. For an excellent treatment of the subject, see PROSSER, Comparative

Negligence, in SELECTED Topics OF THE LAW OF TORTS C. 1 (1954). A proposed
model statute is set out in id. at 68-69; see Wade, Book Review, 8 VAND. L.
REV. 657, 659-60 (1955), for discussion of this statute and suggested refinements.
54. 274 S.W.2d 630 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1954), 23 TENN. L. REV. 1076 (1955).

55. Both holdings are also laid down in Louisville & N. R.R. v. Tucker, 211
F.2d 325, modified on rehearing 215 F.2d 227 (6th Cir. 1954); and Louisville
& N. R.R. v. Farmer, 220 F.2d 90 (6th Cir.. 1955). See also McMahan v. McMahan, 276 S.W.2d 738 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1954) (Ohio law).
56. The court relied primarily on Chumley v. Anderton, 20 Tenn. App. 621,
103 S.W.2d 331 (M.S. 1936). For general treatment see PROSSER, TORTS 366-67
(2d ed. 1955).
In the Hamilton case, the accident happened in Florida so that Florida law

controlled. The court found no Florida decisions in point, however, and mak-

ing the presumption that Florida law was the same as that of Tennessee, it
proceeded to lay down the law for Tennessee.
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The doctrine of assumption of risk was involved in two cases. Assumption of risk corresponds to the defense of consent in an action
for intentional harm. A case of express consent was involved in Martin
v. Greyhound Corp.57 Plaintiff, wife of an employee of defendant,
was traveling on a pass providing that she "voluntarily assumes all
risks of accidents." The pass was regarded as a gratuity so that the
contract to assume the risk was not in violation of federal statute and
was binding on the plaintiff.
The consent need not be express, however, and may be implied
from conduct. In this connection the expression, assumption of risk,
has in many cases been freely and somewhat recklessly used. In
ChattanoogaGas Co. v. Underwood,5 8 the Eastern Section of the Court
of Appeals reacted against this. An explosion had occurred in a
house, and plaintiff, captain in the Chattanooga Fire Department,
came to investigate as a part of his duty. Representatives of the gas
company had already arrived and they informed plaintiff that no
natural gas was involved; there was no smell of natural gas. While
investigating, plaintiff picked up an open cigarette lighter from the
bathroom floor and when he closed it another explosion took place,
injuring him. It was later discovered that the explosions were caused
by natural gas, leaking from a main and coming into the house
through sewer pipes. The gas company's defenses included contributory negligence and assumption of risk. The court held that the issue
of contributory negligence was for the jury and that the defense of
assumption of risk was not available. It said: "In this State the doctrine of assumption of risk is limited in its application to cases of
master and servant, 'but one frequently finds in opinions of the courts
the expression "assumption of risk" as the practical equivalent of
the term "contributory negligence."' 59
The court is correct in saying that the expression is sometimes used
inaccurately as a synonym for contributory negligence. At other times
it is used as an easier way of indicating that the defendant has not
breached his duty. This may help to explain some cases applying the
doctrine to people coming on defendant's premises or to automobile
guests. If the defect is obvious and apparent or the plaintiff knows of
it, the defendant has breached no duty; another way of saying this
is that the plaintiff has assumed the risk. Use of the expression shouzd
be restricted, as Judge Howard suggests in the ChattanoogaGas case.
But there are still cases which would be somewhat difficult to explain
if it were confined solely to master and servant situations. What of
the numerous cases involving spectators at athletic events? In the
57. 125 F. Supp. 362 (M.D. Tenn. 1954).
58 270 S.W.2d 652 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1954).
59. Id. at 659. The double quote is from Bouchard & Sons Co. v. Keaton, 9
Tenn. App. 467, 481 (M.S. 1928).
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Chattanooga Gas case itself, suppose a fire had developed and plaintiff, as a fireman fighting the blaze, had been injured when the house
collapsed. As a fire fighter, would he not have been held to have
assumed this risk?60
4. Damages
In several cases an appellant claimed error as to the damages
awarded but little consideration or discussion was given to the issues
raised and the court did not reverse.61 The Tennessee rule that there
cannot be recovery in a wrongful-death action for loss of society and
companionship was considered in one case.62 There is a possible hint
in another that punitive damages may be added in an appropriate
63
case to nominal damages.
5. ParticularFact Situations and Relationships
(a) Manufacturers
Perhaps the most important Torts case during the Survey period
is Dunn v. Ralston Purina Co. 64 Like other states, Tennessee had an
early decision following the English view that a manufacturer owes
no duty to those not in privity of contract with him to use care in the
making of his products. 65 Exceptions to the rule quickly developed
and multiplied, and beginning with the famous case of MacPherson v.
Buick Motor Co.,66 in New York in 1916, the several states have
gradually abrogated this rule. Tennessee has had some unreported
decisions of the court of appeals to this effect but they did not have
supreme court sanction and the supreme court itself had left the problem open.67 The Dunn case is the first outright, officially recognized
decision and there can now be no doubt as to the Tennessee rule on the
subject.
"The rule now, in our opinion, is that where a product is such that,
if negligently made, it may reasonably be expected to injure the per60. Buckeye Cotton Oil Co. v. Campagna, 146 Tenn. 389, 242 S.W. 646 (1922),
indicates that the owner of the building would not be liable. Would the gas
company be liable for this injury even though its negligence caused the fire,
if there were no subsequent explosions? Should the issue here depend on
whether the plaintiff was contributorily negligent in subjecting himself to the

risk?

61. See, e.g., Finks v. Gillum, 273 S.W.2d 722 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1954); Tennessee Copper Co. v. Smith, 216 F.2d 428 (6th Cir. 1954) (lower court had given
remittitur).

62. Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Perkins, 79 So.2d 459 (Miss. 1955) (Tenn. law). See,
in general, Gamble, Actions for Wrongful Death in Tennessee, 4 VM0. L.
REv. 289 (1951).
63. Butler v. Molinski, 277 S.W.2d 448 (Tenn. 1955).

272 S.W.2d 479 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1954), 23 TENN. L. REV. 1079 (1955).
Burkett v. Studebaker Bros. Mfg. Co., 126 Tenn. 467, 150 S.W. 421 (1912).
217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050, L.R.A. 1916F 696, Ann. Cas. 1916C 440 (1916).
For a more complete treatment of the Tennessee cases prior to the Dunn
see Noel, ProductsLiability of a Manufacturerin Tennessee, 22 TENw.L.
REv. 985 (1953); Wade, Book Review, 22 TENN. L. REV. 444 (1952). Both are
cited in the opinion of the Dunn case.
64.
65.
66.
67.
case,
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son or property of an ultimate user of it, then, irrespective of'contract,
the manufacturer is under a duty to such user to make it carefully." 68
The case involved horse feed which had spoiled and which the jury
might find had caused the death of plaintiff's horse. The court held
that the rule that a manufacturer must use care extends to the manufacture of animal feeds. The spoiled condition of the feed created a
prima facie case of negligence and to the defendant's contention that
the feed had spoiled through natural causes, the court replied that it
Was negligent to put out "without any warning... a product which
was apparently safe, but which to its knowledge would likely spoil and
become dangerous before it could be used for the purpose for which
it was sold." 69 There was also a hint of a possible warranty in the
express representation of defendant's agent that the feed "was safe and
fit and the best feed for his horse," though the decision is clearly based
on negligence.
(b) Landowners
A landlord who leases premises which he knows to have a condition
dangerous to those outside the premises and which will remain this
way may be liable for damages caused by this condition just as the
70
tenant may. This is illustrated by Shuey v. Frierson,
where a rented
building had a door opening out on the sidewalk and the plaintiff was
injured when it opened directly in front of her. Plaintiff had sued both
lessor and lessee. The jury found for the defendant lessee and this
was sustained by the supreme court. A verdict at the same time
against the lessor was reversed by the court of appeals and a new trial
granted, but the jury again found the lessor liable. This verdict was
affirmed by the supreme court on the ground that the lessor's liability
was independent of any misconduct of the lessee and therefore not
derivative.
It is the majority rule that a landlord is not liable to a tenant for
damage caused by the defective condition of the premises, though several exceptions have developed. In Tennessee, starting with the famous
Willcox cases,7 1 the rule is otherwise, and the landlord is under a duty
to use "reasonable care and diligence" to discover defects. In Glassman
72
v. Martin,
the wooden riser for some steps had been eaten out by
termites and the whole stairs collapsed with plaintiff on them. The
defect was not apparent but could have been discovered by punching
the riser with an ice pick. The court of appeals affirmed a jury verdict
for the plaintiff, but the supreme court reversed, saying: "The law does
68. 272 S.W.2d at 481.
69. Id. at 482.
70. 270 S.W.2d 883 (Tenn. 1954), 23 TENN. L. REv. 899 (1955).
71. Hines v. Willcox, 96 Tenn. 148, 33 S.W. 914 (1896); Hines v. Willcox, 96
Tenn. 328, 34 S.W. 420 (1896); Willcox v. Hines, 100 Tenn. 524, 45 S.W. 781
(1898); Willcox v. Hines, 100 Tenn. 538, 46 S.W. 297 (1898).
72. 196 Tenn. 595, 269 S.W.2d 908 (1954).
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not impose upbn the,landlord the duty of constant care ahd'inspectioi
of the premises. It imposes upon him the duty- of reasonable care- to
'73
inform himself of the condition of the property.
The liability of a landowner to a person who comes on
to his

premises was involved in De Soto Auto Hotel, Inc. v. McDonough.74
Plaintiff went into defendant garage .with a friend who 'had stored
his car there. He slipped on some grease on the floor and fell, breaking
his leg. The court affirmed a jury verdict for plaintiff, holding that he
was a business guest rather than a licensee. Two reasons were given
for this, though it is not clear that the court regarded, them as separate
reasons: "(1) It is not necessary in order for a person to be a business
invitee that he be expressly invited to come upon the -premises for
the purpose of doing business with the owner. An inyitation is implied
when the owner, by acts or conduct leads another to 'the belief that the
use of the premises is in accordance with the design for which the
place was adapted and allowed to be used in mutuality of interest....
(2) The visit may be for the convenience or arise out of the necessities
75
of others who are themselves upon the premises for such-a purpose.1
Either basis for calling the plaintiff -a business guest would have been
adequate. The jury's finding of negligence was held to be justified
since the defendant knew that cars dripped oil and gas and had a
janitor whose duty it was to clean it off but who had not-been in that
part of the garage for over an hour.76
(c) Traffic and Transportation
Automobiles.-About half of the Torts cases during the Survey
period involved the operation of automobiles. Most of them were cases
of collision between two automobiles, but in three there was a crossing
collision with a train, 77 in two a car struck a pedestrian,7 8 in one a car
left the road on a curve 79 and in another a vehicle struck a building. 80
In three cases where defendant was blocking the highway he wag
73. Id. at 601, 269 S.W.2d at 910. See, in general, Comment, Landlord and
TENN. L. REV. 219 (1954)
74. 219 F.2d 253 (6th Cir. 1955).
75. Id. at 255.
76. Two other cases may be somewhat relevant to this section. Massey v.

Tenant: Tort Liability in Tennessee, 23

Chattanooga Station Co., 210 F.2d 167 (6th Cir. 1954), involves the duty of a

master to use care to provide a safe place to work and safe tools. Gerwin
v. American News Co., 270 S.W.2d 354 (Tenn. 1954), suggests that one tenant
will be liable to another when his activities damage him.
77. Louisville & N. R.R. v. Farmer, 220 F.2d 90 (6th Cir. 1955); Louisville &
N. R.R. v. Tucker, 211 F.2d 325, modifted on rehearing,215 F.2d 227 (6th Cir.

1954); Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Perkins, 79 So.2d 459 (Miss. 1955). The railroad
aspects of these cases are discussed later.
78. Jones v. Agnew, 274 S.W.2d 821 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1954), 274 S.W.2d 825
(Tenn. 1954) (statute raising presumption of agency); Roach v. Franzle, 37
Tenn. App. 629, 268 S.W.2d 118 (M.S. 1954) (jury verdict for defendant).
79. McMahan v. McMahan, 276 S.W.2d 738 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1954)

(Ohio

guest statute).
80. McCloud v. City of La Follette, 276 S.W.2d 763 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1954)
(res ipsa loquitur).
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found liable. 8' The speed limit was involved in several cases.82 Two
cases involved foreign automobile guest statutes. 83 Plaintiff was hit
from behind in one case, 84 another involved a collision at an intersection,85 and another involved the rule of the road.86 There were several
miscellaneous decisions. 87 None of the automobile cases raised questions of law which have not been adequately discussed in the general
treatment of negligence.
Railroads.-The three cases involving railroad crossing collisions
were all concerned with the Railroad Precaution Statute (Section
2628). All raised an issue under subsection (4), the lookout provision,
requiring a lookout and adding that "when any person, animal, or
other obstruction appears upon the road, the alarm whistle shall be
sounded, the brakes put down, and every possible means employed to
stop the train and prevent an accident." When does an obstruction
appear upon the road? In Majestic v. Louisville & N. R.R.,88 decided
in 1945, the federal court of appeals laid down the interpretation that
"'the road', in contemplation of the statute, is not merely what is
called strictly the roadbed or track, but also includes the public approaches thereto and it is the duty of the lookout to view the whole
road within the orbit of his vision."8 9
This interpretation was quoted and relied on during the Survey
period in Louisville & N. R.R. v. Tucker9 but after the holding was
rendered, on petition for rehearing together with a brief by amici
81. Carney v. Goodman, 270 S.W.2d 572 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1954) (rear of
diagonally parked car protruded 2 to 5 feet on highway); Shuler v. Clabough,
274 S.W.2d 17 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1954) (truck left parked on highway without

flags or flares); Noe v. Talley, 274 S.W.2d 367 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1954) (gasoline

truck stalled on highway emitting large clouds of smoke obscuring it).
82. Home v. Palmer, 274 S.W.2d 372 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1954); Hopper v.
United States, 122 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. Tenn. 1953), affd mem., 214 F.2d 129
(6th Cir. 1954); Tennessee Copper Co. v. Smith, 216 F.2d 428 (6th Cir. 1954);
Jones v. Agnew, 274 S.W.2d 821 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1954), aff'd, 274 S.W.2d 825
(Tenn. 1954) (ambulance).
83. Hamilton v. Peoples, 274 S.W.2d 630 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1954) (Florida);
McMahan v. McMahan, 276 S.W.2d 738 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1954) (Ohio).
84. Finks v. Gillum, 273 S.W.2d 722 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1954). Cf. Carney v.
Goodman, 270 S.W.2d 572 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1954) (driver of first truck stopped
for obstruction in road, driver of second truck did not see him in time to
stop; passenger in second truck failed to recover from driver of first truck
because no proof of negligence).
85. Home v. Palmer, 274 S.W.2d 372 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1954).
86. Hopper v. United States, 122 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. Tenn. 1953), aff'd mem.,

214 F.2d 129 (6th Cir. 1954).
87. Gogan v. Jones, 273 S.W.2d 700 (Tenn. 1954) (suit by foreign administrator for death in accident in Tennessee); Franklin v. Wills, 217 F.2d 899 (6th
Cir. 1954) (action by wife for North Carolina accident); Fontenot v. Roach, 120
F. Supp. 788 (E.D. Tenn. 1954) (attempt to bring in driver of plaintifl's car, as
third party defendant for contribution).
88. 147 F.2d 621 (6th Cir. 1945).
89. Id. at 624-25. The court relied on Nashville & C. R.R. v. Anthony, 69
Tenn. 516 (1879). This was a case of horses caught within the fences of the
railroad right of way and perhaps not on the track while running before the
train until they jumped in front of it and were struck.
90. 211 F.2d 325 (6th Cir. 1954).
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curiae, the court became convinced that it was inconsistent with the
interpretation of the State Supreme Court, and it deleted this part of
its opinion, though declining to change the actual holding in the case.91
This modffied view was followed, with explanation, in Louisville &
N. R.R. v. Farmer,92 and it appears that the federal courts are now
completely in accord with state court position that "appearance on the
road means appearance on the track in front of the moving train, or
93
so near that the object will be struck by the moving train."
In Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Perkins,9 on the other hand, the Mississippi
court, in applying the Tennessee statute, had its attention called to the
interpretation laid down in the Majestic case but not to the later modification. As a result in a case where decedent struck the front drive
wheel of the engine, the court held that "The jury was well warranted
in finding that if the engineer had been keeping the proper lookout as
required by the statute, viewing the crossing ahead and the approaches
thereto, all within the orbit or range of his vision, he would have
observed the deceased approaching the crossing at a time when the
engineer was at a distance of 150 feet from the crossing, and that had
he then immediately applied his emergency brake as the statute requires, the collision might have been avoided." 95 A moment's reflection will indicate the implications of this decision if it and the Majestic
interpretation were actually the law in Tennessee. Every time a car
approaching an intersection was within the orbit of the engineer's view
he would be required to put on his emergency brakes to avert a possible collision. No comment seems necessary.98
The Perkins case also involved Subsection (3) of the Precautions
Statute, the bell-ringing provision requiring the train to-sound a bell
or whistle one mile from a city or town and at short intervals thereafter. The engineer had not sounded the signals until he reached a
point about a half mile before reaching the city limits of Selmer. This
violated the statute, and the court held, in accordance with established
authority, that this made the railroad liable, whether this failure was
a cause of the accident or not.9 7 Here is another place where inter91. 215 F.2d 227 (6th Cir. 1954).
92. 220 F.2d 90, 97 (6th Cir. 1955).
93. Gaines v. Tennessee Cent. Ry., 175 Tenn. 389, 393, 135 S.W.2d 441, 442
(1940). The modification of the holding in the Tucker case is overlooked in
Comment, Look Out Ahead-Tennessee Grade Crossings,23 TENN. L. REV. 865
(1955), and the Farmer case had apparently not been published when it was
written.
94. 79 So.2d 459 (Miss. 1955).
95. Id. at 467.
96. Contrast the holding in Tennessee Cent. Ry. v. Ledbetter, 159 Tenn. 404,
19 S.W.2d 258 (1929).
97. See, e.g., Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Davis, 104 Tenn. 442, 449, 58 S.W. 296, 298
(1900): 'The... assignment is that the Court erred in refusing defendant's
request, to the effect that if the jury found that the bell or whistle on said
train was sounded at short intervals for a distance of one-half or threequarters of a mile from the corporate limits of South Fulton in the State of
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pretation of the statute might reasonably be modified. It would appar"ently make no .difference if the bell had been continuously sounded
after that time and the deceased had actually heard it in time to stop.
It apparently makes no difference how large the city is. Is it illogical
to take the holding further and say that a failure to sound before entering the preceding town or on the preceding day also makes the railroad liable, or is this a reductio-ad absurdum?
The rue .that the statute does not apply to switching operations
was held in'the. Tucker case 98 to be confined to operations in the
switching yard, where the tracks do not cross a street or road.
In both federal cases the plaintiffs relied not only on the statute but
also on common law negligence. Normal principles of negligence apply
then, even though the railroad may be found guilty of negligence per
se in violating a municipal ordinance. 99
Carriers.-:-In Martin v. Greyhound Corp., 00 involving a carrier of
passengers, it was held that a provision in a pass that the recipient
assumed the risk of all injuries was valid and binding.
Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Smith'0 ' involves the liability of
a carrier for goods shown to be properly packed and in good condition
when received and damaged when delivered. In Railway Express
Agency v. General Shoe Corp.,0 2 the provision in the uniform express
receipt that as a condition precedent to recovery a claim must be made
in Writing within nine months and fifteen days after shipment was
held to be biding, and applicable to a tort action for conversion as
well as a contract action.
(d) Public Service Companies
In two cases involving gas companies there were explosions.
Chattanooga Gas Co. v. Underwood0 3 held that the company "was
under a duty to use reasonable diligence in the inspection of its pipes,
mains and connections, and the fact that the leaks from which the
gas escaped could have been discovered by the exercise of reasonable
diligence previous to the explosions was sufficient, under the circumstances, to charge the defendant with negligence." It was also held
Tennessee, that this was a substantial compliance with the statute .... We
think the instruction was properly refused, for the reason the statute requires
that the bell and whistle shall be sounded at the distance of one mile from the
town.... The statute is imperative, and the breach of it gives a right of action,
whether the nonobservance of the statute was the proximate cause of the
accident or not." See also Southern Ry. v. Kuykendall, 186 S.W.2d 617 (Tenn.
App. E.S. 1944), citing and quoting from numerous other cases.
98. 211 F.2d 325, 332 (6th Cir. 1954).
99. Proximate cause is required and contributory negligence bars recovery
unless it is remote contributory negligence. Louisville & N. R.R. v. Farmer,
220 F.2d 90, 95-96, 99 (6th Cir. 1955).
100. 125 F. Supp. 362 (M.D. Tenn. 1954).
101. 212 F.2d 47 (6th Cir. 1954).
102. 276 S.W.2d 725 (Tenn. 1955).
103. 270 S.W.2d 652, 65a (Tenn. App. E.S. 1954),
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that the jury might find the defendant negligent in failing properly
to odorize the gas.
In Rader v. Nashville Gas Co., 04 on the other hand, the defendant
was found not negligent as a matter of law in removing a meter in a
building and capping the gas line in the ground without removing it,
so that it was not liable when the building was torn down and the
line broken by heavy dirt-moving equipment.
(e) Professions
Of the two cases on malpractice, one involved a physician'0 5 and
the other an attorney. 106 Both turned on side issues and provided little
discussion of the standard of care. 107 Two quotations from the physician case may be pertinent. "The mere fact that the professional
service rendered was not a success does not in any sense justify the
conclusion that the defendant was guilty of actionable negligence."' 0 8
As to "petitioner's contention that negligent malpractice may be
shown by testimony other than by expert testimony, .. . [n]o doubt
there are cases where the nature and extent of an injury would
sustain this contention, as where the rule res ipsa loquitur applies.
But it is not true in the case at bar."'0 9
II.OTHER TORTS

1. Assault and Battery
In Blalock v. Temple," 0 the two defendants had stopped at plaintiff's
filling station, engaged in an argument and had a fight. They then
bought soft drinks. One of them finished his drink and started toward
the other, who threw a bottle at him. It missed and hit a glass door,
knocking glass in plaintiff's eye and putting it out. The court held
that there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could find
that the second fight was a continuation of the first and held both
defendants liable. "[W]here two or more persons engage in an
unlawful act and one of them commits a serious, civil injury upon a
person not engaged therein, all are equally liable for damages to the
injured party.""'
In Butler v. Molinski,"2 the court spoke by way of dictum of the
action which one would have when a doctor not authorized by the
104. 37 Tenn. App. 621, 268 S.W.2d 114 (M.S. 1953).
105. Butler v. Molinski, 277 S.W.2d 448 (Tenn. 1955).
106. Bland v. Smith, 277 S.W.2d 377 (Tenn. 1955).

107. In the Butler case the issue was whether a husband could recover for
loss of consortium when a wrist set by defendant failed to knit properly. In
the Bland case the issue was the statute of limitations and whether the action
was in tort or contract. The tort limitation period was applied.
108. 277 S.W.2d at 451.
109. Id. at 452.
110. 276 S.W.2d 493 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1954).
111. Id. at 496.
112. 277 S.W.2d 448 (Tenn. 1955).
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patient to set a wrist, did so himself instead of having the authorized
doctor do it. If there were no injury the only damages for the battery
would be nominal, with possible punitive damages. But the court
held that the patient's husband had no action as there was no battery
or other injury to him.
2. Defamation
A letter saying that defendant's former wife had been a prostitute
was held libelous per se in Williams v. Shelton.113 The Tennessee rule
that "each publication of a libel constitutes a separate cause of action"
was repeated in Forgey v. Wallin.11 4 Statements in a pleading were
declared to be privileged if they were pertinent to the proceeding in
Lann v. Third National Bank.11 5 It was held in Smith v. Archer o
that when defamatory words are spoken of two or more persons they
cannot join in a single action because the wrong done to one is no
wrong to the others.
3. Alienation of Affections
In Scates v. Nailling,1n 7 an action for criminal conversation and
alienation of affection was held to lie when brought by a married
woman. Rheudasil v. Clower" 8 was an action for alienation of affections. Both cases turned on the statute of limitations.
4. Malicious Prosecution
In Ernstv.
an employer had brought an action of replevin
against a former employee, claiming that the tools which the latter
took belonged to him; but he lost the action. He later swore out
warrants for larceny and receiving stolen goods and participated in
the arrest. When the grand jury returned no true bill, the employee
brought this action of malicious prosecution. The court of appeals
affirmed a jury verdict for $7500, with a remittitur for $4500, holding
that the jury might reasonably find malice and lack of probable cause.
To the defense that the defendant had acted on the advice of a law
student, qualified to practice law, the court declared that the student
had acted as an investigator and had participated in making the
decisions and therefore "owed the same duty as the client to use
Bennett,1 1 9

reasonable diligence and make proper investigation ...

and ...

was

chargeable with knowledge of all the facts he could have learned by
such diligence...."120
113.
114.
115.
116.

125 F. Supp. 355 (M.D. Tenn. 1954).
270 S.W.2d 342 (Tenn. 1954).
277 S.W.2d 439 (Tenn. 1955).
270 S.W.2d 375 (Tenn. 1954).

117. 196 Tenn. 508, 268 S.W.2d 561 (1954).

118. 270 S.W.2d 345 (Tenn. 1954).
119. 273 S.W.2d 492 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1954).

120. Id. at 495.

TORTS
5. Tortious Interference with Prospective Advantage
The complicated set of facts alleged by plaintiff in her declaration
in Lann v. Third NationalBank'2 1 was as follows: Complainant owned
a tourist court (claimed to be worth $40,000), subject to a mortgage for
$14,000; she also owed defendant bank $2675. She went to the bank
to borrow funds to refinance the mortgage and cover her debt to the
bank, but it refused. The mortgagee then advertised the property for
foreclosure, and being unable to find funds complainant entered into
an arrangement with another party to convey the property to him for
$16,000, he giving her back a year's repurchase option for $18,000 and
renting the property to her. The deed was recorded but not the option
or the lease. The bank urged her to pledge her option to it as security
for her debt to it and when she declined, it advised her to see a named
real estate agent about selling and this agency seemed interested. But
apparently on the same day the bank filed a bill against her, alleging
fraud and seeking to have the deed declared a mortgage. (This bill
was later voluntarily dismissed with costs by the bank after she
answered it.) When news of this suit reached the papers, the real
estate agent lost interest and other agents also had no interest. She
was finally forced to sell for $23,500, which left her $313 after she had
paid off all debts and attorney's fees. Defendant's demurrer to the
declaration was sustained in the trial court and the supreme court
affirmed.
The parties and the court were unable to agree upon the nature of
the tort for which complainant was suing. Complainant characterized
the action as being for "interference with and injury to [her] business."
Defendant described the suit as "(1) slander of property, based upon
the alleged false and defamatory matter obtained in the original bill
in a prior case, and (2) moral or business duress based alike on said
alleged false and defamatory matter and other facts and circumstances." The court did not attempt to choose between these three
classifications, but apparently it was influenced by defendant's emphasis on "false and defamatory matter."
In an action for libel, it correctly indicated, defamatory matter contained in a pleading is absolutely privileged so long as it is pertinent
to the proceeding. In this case the gravamen of the complaint was
based on the allegations of fraud which were contained in the bank's
original bill and which had the effect of causing real estate agents to
take a hands-off attitude toward the property. The court continued:
"Obviously the reason for the rule [that matters stated in a pleading
are privileged] lies, not in whether it is a suit for libel or slander or
what form the action on which their falsity is based takes but in the
fact that in the interest of justice litigants are protected against suits
121. 277 S.W.2d 439 (Tenn. 1955).
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made upon the falsity of allegations which are made in good faith,
regardless of what kind of an action it is. Thus it seems to us that it
would make no difference what we call this action there can be no
liability under the allegations of this bill because it seems to us that
the allegations of the bill of the bank were pertinent to the issues
therein."122
There is a tort known as interference with prospective advantage, 123
and the Tennessee court has recognized it.124 I have found no case
raising the specific issue discussed in this case, as to the effect on the
action of the privileged character of statements in a pleading. There
are several cases, however, in which relief was granted against the
filing of numerous unwarranted civil actions for the purpose of injuring plaintiff's business or prospective advantage. 12
By analogy to the well-recognized tort of malicious prosecution, a
majority of American states today permit an action in tort to be maintained "for the unjustifiable initiation of any civil action resulting
in actual damage.' 1 26 Tennessee agrees with this majority position. 127
This is the real basis upon which the complainant should have been
suing. If the bank's original bill (in the nature of a creditor's bill) was
unjustified litigation, she should be allowed to recover. She has shown
actual damage and termination of the suit in her favor; it remains to
be seen whether there were "malice" (improper purpose) and lack
of probable cause. If these elements should be shown to be present,
too, then the tort of wrongful civil proceedings combined with the
tort of wrongful interference with prospective advantage provide the
plaintiff's cause of action. It then makes no difference whether the
bank's pleading was defamatory or not, and the issue of privilege does
not arise at all.
122. Id. at 443. Following this conclusion, the court spent considerable time
discussing Johnson v. Ford, 147 Tenn. 63, 245 S.W. 531 (1922), and the theory
of duress of property. It declared that "in a suit for duress of property the
duress must be wrongful, tortious, or unlawful" (277 S.W.2d at 443), and
decided that the various acts of the bank did not come within this classification. It would seem that the suit for duress of property would not succeed
here for another reason. It is not a suit in tort but for restitution-to recover
an enrichment which the defendant unjustly obtained at plaintiff's expense.
(This was true in Johnson v. Ford, supra, for example). In the instant case
there is no indication that the bank profited or obtained any enrichment from
the complainant.
123. See PROSSER, TORTS § 107 (2d ed. 1955). And see Annot., 9 A.L.R.2d
228 (1950), relied on by the complainant.
124. See, e.g., Hutton v. Watters, 132 Tenn. 527, 179 S.W. 134, L.R.A. 1916B
1238, Ann. Cas. 1916C 433 (1915); cf. McKee v. Hughes, 133 Tenn. 455, 181 S.W.
930, L.R.A. 1916D 391, Ann. Cas. 1918A 459 (1916).

125. Maytag Co. v. Meadows Mfg. Co., 35 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1929); Munson
Line v. Green, 6 F.R.D. 14 (S.D. N.Y. 1946), 56 YALE L.J. 885 (1947). In Dehydro, Inc. v. Tretolite Co., 53 F.2d 273 (D. Okla. 1931), where the suits were
threatened the court declared that the gravamen of the action was not the
defamatory nature of the threats but the unfair competition aspect.
126. PROSSER, TORTS § 99 (2d ed. 1955).
127. Lipscomb v. Shofner, 96 Tenn. 112, 33 S.W. 818 (1896).
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III. MISCELLANEOUS

1. Joint Tortfeasors
liable to a
When parties engage in a fight together both of them are
128
third person for the full damages caused by one of them.
When the liability of one of two persons is derivative, depending
on the negligence of the other (as in the master-servant relationship),
a holding for the second means that the first is also released. This
rule was held not to apply to a lessor-lessee relationship in Shuey v.
Frierson,29 since the lessor might be liable "on grounds other than the
misconduct of the lessee."
The Tennessee rule that there may be contribution between negli30
gent tortfeasors was held in Fontenot v. Roach not to combine with
the federal third-party practice to allow a defendant to bring in a third
party for the purpose of obtaining contribution.
2. Tort or Contract?
Bland v. Smith13' involved an action against an attorney for improper representation in a divorce action. In determining Whether the
suit was in tort or contract (for purposes of the statute of limitations),
the court declared that it "must look to the plaintiff's declaration to
determine the real purpose of the law suit.... In determining the real
purpose or the gravamen of the action the Court must look to the basis
for which damages are sought."'3 Plaintiff sought punitive damages
and claimed that defendant's conduct resulted "to his great damage,
injury, and detriment," producing "no end of pain and mental
anguish." As a result the court concluded "that the plaintiff based his
entire action not only on tort to begin with, but injuries to his
person."'3
3. Statute of Limitations
In Bland v. Smith, just discussed, the court held that an action
against an attorney for malpractice was not in contract but in tort for
personal injury and it applied the one-year statute of limitations. The
statute was held to start running when the attorney's services were
completed and since this was a tort action it was not tolled by a later
34
payment of money.
In Scates v. Nailling,135 an action for criminal conversation and
alienation of affections, the court held that the statute of limitations
begins to run "when from the conduct of the erring spouse, or other128. Blalock v. Temple, 276 S.W.2d 493 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1954).
129. 270 S.W.2d 883 (Tenn. 1954), 23 TENN.L. REV. 899 (1955).
130. 120 F. Supp. 788 (E.D. Tenn. 1954).

131.
132.
133.
134.

277 S.W.2d 377 (Tenn. 1955).
Id. at 379.
Id. at 380.
Id. at 380-81.

135. 196 Tenn. 508, 268 S.W.2d 561 (1954).
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wise, the other spouse knows that he or she has a cause of action."
Unlike an action for seduction, it does not start anew for each act; nor
is delay allowed for attempted reconciliation. In Rheudasil v.
Clower,3 6 the one-year statute expressly applying to criminal conversation was held to apply to alienation of affections; and it began
running from the time plaintiff became aware of the alienation, not
from the time of final separation.
4. Governmental Immunity
In Barnett v. Memphis,137 a board of education and its individual
members were held entitled to immunity and not liable for injuries
suffered by a boy at school. Washing of streets by a city was held to
be a governmental function in McCloud v. City of La Follette,138 but
the city was held to be liable to the extent of the liability insurance it
maintained. Plaintiff might allege and prove the amount of insurance.
136. 270 S.W.2d 345 (Tenn. 1954), 23 TENN. L. REV. 1046 (1955).
137. 196 Tenn. 590, 269 S.W.2d 906 (1954).

138. 276 S.W.2d 763 (Tenn. E.S. 1954).

